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Crowd-patronage – Intermediaries, Geographies and Relationships in Patronage Networks 
 
Jon Swords, Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University, UK 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article introduces a new mode of patronage of the arts: crowd-patronage. In so doing the article 
illustrates the plural roles of intermediaries in patronage networks which go beyond Bourdieuian cultural 
intermediaries to include regulatory and financial actors. A brief history of patronage is presented which 
outlines different modes and eras of patronage for the arts since the 12th century. Particular attention is paid 
to the geographies of patronage networks, the mobility of artists, the plurality of roles played by 
intermediaries and the relations between patrons and artists. These themes then structure the analysis of 
crowd-patronage through a case study of the patronage platform Patreon in the remainder of the paper. 
Crowd-patronage is distinctive because of the scale and geographical scope of patronage networks, its focus 
on funding practice rather than outputs, a shift in the power relationships between patron and artist, and 
processes of re-intermediation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Patronage has long been a key form of support for artists. From Welsh courts in the 12th century to 
contemporary transnational corporate players, artists have worked with patrons to produce art that has 
served political, economic and cultural functions. This paper presents crowd-patronage as a new form of 
patronage of the arts. Mediated through the web by platforms such as Patreon.com, crowd-patronage is 
qualitatively and quantitatively different to other types of patronage, and allows patrons to support artists 
around the world through monthly payments. Crowd-patronage refigures relationships between artist and 
patron, shifting the control over what and how work is produced from patrons to artists, and allows more 
people to engage in funding the arts. The primary focus of this article is Patreon, a San Francisco-based 
start-up established in 2013 and supported by venture capital investment. In 2016 Patreon was used by over 
50 000 artists from over 90 countries and facilitated the transfer of $100m of financial support from patrons 
to its artist base (Conte, 2017). Users include Grammy-winning musicians, renowned digital artists, 
bestselling authors, award-winning journalists and producers of some of the most popular webcomics and 
podcasts online. 
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In examining crowd-patronage this article explores the role of intermediaries in patronage networks. 
Mobilising approaches from economic sociology, the focus here shifts from cultural intermediaries to a 
wider set of actors defined primarily by their function rather than occupation, and includes those 
undertaking financial and regulatory roles. Adopting this approach illustrates the plural functions played by 
these wider groups of intermediaries, processes of re-intermediation and the consequences for artists. The 
paper begins by reviewing the literature on cultural intermediaries and builds the case for a broader 
understanding of their functions. A typology of five modes of patronage is introduced in section 3, before 
section 4 outlines the methods and data used to explain the case study of Patreon examined in section 5. 
 
2. Intermediaries and Artistic Production 
 
As is common in the field of cultural production, a patron or artist’s position within patronage networks is 
mutually constituted by relations with other actors. These include intermediaries who contribute to the 
regulation, curation, value, production and consumption of cultural products. The aim of this section is to 
examine the role of intermediaries within cultural production more broadly, and in so doing introduce the 
conceptual framework through which the geographies of patronage are understood in this article. 
 
There has been a great deal of debate within disciplines concerned with culture about the role of cultural 
intermediaries in shaping aesthetic and symbolic value since Bourdieu’s (1984) seminal contribution. His 
categorisation of ‘new cultural intermediaries’ sparked work examining their role in adding value in the 
circulation and (re)production of cultural goods and services. As scholars have sought out cultural 
intermediaries in increasingly diverse contexts, the concept has become elastic, which at best questions its 
parameters (Smith Maguire and Matthews, 2014) and at worst sees it criticised for being “a dog’s dinner” 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 227; see also McFall, 2002; Molloy and Larner, 2010). 
 
Lizé (2016) offers a more precise categorisation outlining a typology of intermediaries which shifts the 
emphasis from occupation to function (see also Miller, 2014 and Zolberg, 1983). Table 1 builds on and 
expands Lizé’s template and adds financial and regulatory intermediaries which play important roles in 
patronage networks.  
 
Intermediary 
Type 
Function Examples 
Mediators Actors “guiding the audience 
through its relationship with the 
artworks” (Lizé, 2016: 36) or 
independent third parties brokering 
relationships between other actors 
Booksellers, museum workers, 
radio hosts, fans, brokers 
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Appraisers-
prescribers 
Professionals and amateurs who 
make quality judgements, and 
curating what is good and bad 
Critics, experts, members of 
juries, reviewers 
Curators Those making implicit and explicit 
curatorial decisions 
Directors of cultural institutions, 
museum directors, radio 
programmers, curators, 
recommendation algorithms 
Distributors “intermediaries of the art market” 
(Lizé, 2016: 37) 
Film or music distributors, 
publishers, cinema owners, online 
media platforms 
Intermediaries of 
production 
“have a hand in the creation process 
and most of them bring cultural 
goods to market” (ibid) 
Publishers, music producers, 
gallery owners, TV 
commissioners 
Intermediaries of 
artistic work 
“set between artists and employers” 
(ibid) 
Working for artists: managers and 
agents 
 
Gatekeepers working for 
employers, investors or 
producers: talent buyers, scouts, 
casting agents 
 
 
Financial 
intermediaries 
“to effectuate more efficient 
transactions…to make it easier and 
cheaper for parties seeking financing 
to work with a specialized third party 
than to do it on their own” (Lin, 
2015) 
 
Banks, credit card companies, 
credit unions, venture capitalists, 
online payment providers 
Regulatory 
intermediaries 
Actors involved in the (formal and 
informal) regulation and 
accreditation of professional 
standards, terms of use and legal 
instruments 
Professional bodies, community 
guidelines, laws, terms of service 
 
Table 1: Intermediaries involved in patronage networks (adapted from Lizé, 2016) 
 
This typology is used below to identify different types of intermediaries in the history of patronage. 
However, it is important to highlight that, like the work of others (Featherstone, 1991), Lizé’s conceptual 
framing of production as separate from consumption is problematic. McFall (2014) argues that the 
simultaneity of production and consumption undermines the notion of intermediation between them and 
suggests they are “always already, dynamically connected” (p.45). Drawing on work on economies of 
qualities (Callon et al., 2002; Musselin and Paradeise, 2005), McFall follows Muniesa et al.’s (2007: 2) call to 
focus on ‘agencements’ or market devices to understand: “the material and discursive assemblages that 
intervene in the construction of markets”. Doing so shifts the emphasis from intermediaries as creating (or 
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destroying) symbolic value to a wider group of actors influencing how cultural products are understood and 
used (McFall, 2014). This includes human and non-human actors such as algorithms, trading protocols, 
advertisements and pricing systems (Muniesa et al., 2007; Caliskan, 2007; McFall, 2014; Callon, 2005). 
 
The identification of this ‘crowd of intermediaries’ (McFall, 2014) means focusing, first, on products and, 
second, on actors mediating their value within markets. But rather than focus on the products within 
patronage networks I want to argue the focus should be on artists and patrons, the role played by 
intermediaries, and in turn the way these actors (re)produce geographies of patronage. In so doing the 
function of intermediaries widens to include those identified by Lizé (2016), sociotechnical devices such as 
algorithms, and other types of actors who function as financial and regulatory intermediaries. Here, 
consumers are understood as part of the process through which artists and their products gain meaning and 
value. This also allows us to appreciate better how intermediaries take on these positions simultaneously: as 
I illustrate below, patrons in particular take up multifaceted roles. Thus, intermediaries should be 
appreciated for their plural, multi-functional roles, not only in relation to aesthetic and symbolic value 
creation, but also involving financial intermediation, the regulation of professions and standards, and, in 
more recent examples, as distributors and publishers of cultural products. 
 
Such plurality can be seen in the processes of dis- and re-intermediation. The number of intermediaries 
involved in activities across the economy has grown to the point where offering to remove them has 
become attractive, particularly in consumer markets where direct marketing and sales have increased. 
Disintermediation is usually accompanied by increased availability of information via the internet about 
what products are available or how to access them, allowing the consumer to reduce information and 
transactional costs by undertaking search roles themselves (Riemer and Lehrke, 2009).  
 
In the creative industries disintermediation is a result of two factors. First, barriers to entry have fallen as 
high-quality equipment and software has become more available and easier to use (Miller, 2014). Second, 
market access is made easier as gatekeepers such as record companies and film studios can be bypassed with 
web-based, free-to-use platforms such as YouTube (Hirsch and Gruber, 2015). As the influence of 
traditional intermediaries of production has reduced, power has shifted to new forms of digital distribution 
and aggregators including Spotify and Apple (Galuszka, 2015). Such processes, however, involve the 
introduction of new intermediaries who provide new services (e.g. Hulu replacing cable TV providers), or 
aggregating products for end-user platforms (e.g. TuneCore) (ibid). The result is not disintermediation but 
re-intermediation as new intermediaries displace and replace existing intermediaries (French and Leyshon, 
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2004). This is perhaps inevitable for while the rhetoric of online economies is one of flattening, speeding up 
and efficiencies, the web is a tool for generating revenues: 
 
“…the expectation that the network economy favors disintermediation is exactly wrong. It is quite the 
opposite. Network technologies do not eliminate intermediaries. They spawn them by definition, every node 
on a network is a node between other nodes.” 
(Kelly, 1998: 100 original emphasis) 
 
Through re-intermediation actors take on plural functions. Consumers become simultaneously consumers 
and appraisers as they are enrolled into review and recommendation systems. Distributors such as Amazon 
and Netflix become intermediaries of production as they seek greater control over their services. Similar 
plurality of functions can also be seen where tasks once undertaken by production intermediaries are 
removed as new companies seek lean business models and pass the tasks to artists. As Kribs (2016) argues, 
disintermediation isn’t liberating for artists, rather they become ‘artist-as-intermediary’ (see also Zolberg, 
1983). As well as producing work, they have to build brand image, manage it through social media, handle 
fan relations and do promotional activity, taking on the functions of mediators, intermediaries of production 
and intermediaries of [their own] artistic work. The next section provides more examples of the plural 
functions of actors in patronage networks as a typology of patronage is outlined. 
 
3. Typology of Patronage 
 
Patronage is perhaps the oldest type of formal support for the arts, and the breadth of work from across 
arts, humanities and social sciences reflects this. The intricacies of patronage relationships and range of 
contexts in which it is found mean this scholarship has necessarily had a narrow focus. It examines the work 
of individual artists or schools (Gardner, 2011), particular patrons (Ryan, 2007), periods of history (Kempers, 
1993), modes of support (Cummings and Katz, 1989) and geographies (Blum, 1969). Such work provides 
detailed accounts and fascinating insights into the role of patronage in cultural production, but systematic 
overviews are rare. Raymond Williams’ (1981) examination is perhaps the best, and it is the starting point for 
this section. He identifies four modes of patronage which are combined here with the work of other 
scholars to outline a typology of patronage, which helps place crowd-patronage in an historical context. This 
account is, in the interests of space, necessarily broad, and draws on exemplars to highlight the 
characteristics of each type which are outlined using four themes: geographic scale of patronage networks, 
the mobility of artists, the nature of patron-artist relations, and the role of intermediaries. 
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3.1 Early Patronage 
 
For Williams the first proper mode of patronage is ‘early patronage’. He illustrates its emergence with court 
poets, or ‘poets of the princes’, in 12th century Wales. Instead of finding a role within a tribe (as bards had 
previously done), poets were attached to households, travelling between them and performing their work in 
return for “hospitality and support” (Williams, 1981: 39) and up to forty pence for major pieces (Parry, 
1952). Networks were local to regional in scale with poets relatively mobile, although some became attached 
to individual courts. The poets formed orders headed by the ‘Chief of Song’ (or Pencerdd) who sang at 
ceremonial occasions, but also played an intermediary role as an early kind of what Lizé terms ‘intermediary 
of artistic work’, operating between poets and employers to assign poets to nobles. They were also 
regulatory intermediaries responsible for reproducing and regulating the quality of poets by overseeing the 
examination of apprentices (Parry, 1952; Koch and Minard, 2012). Not a great deal is known about patron-
artist relations within this era, but these early patrons are recognised as using their political and economic 
power for cultural (re)production. For Williams (1981) this era of patronage represented the “social self-
definition of the patronizing household…to assume what was at once a responsibility and an honour” (p.39). 
Such households elevated the poets by facilitating their artistic production through important occasions 
(Koch and Minard, 2012). Together with Pencredd, then, households acted as curatorial intermediaries to 
shape what was acceptable, of quality and worthy of reproduction. 
 
3.2 Retainer and Commission Patronage 
 
Perhaps the best-known form of patronage Williams (1981) calls ‘retainer and commission’ patronage. This 
involved a variety of different arrangements, but most commonly painters, sculptors, architects, writers and 
musicians produced art for patrons on a commission basis. A key distinction between this type of patronage 
and ‘early patronage’ was that art was no longer produced as part of societal ceremonies, but as decoration, 
status symbol and within more complex political milieux. The zenith of retainer and commission patronage 
can be found in Renaissance Italy. During this era artists often started their careers in their home town, then 
with success became more mobile, following the money and commissions to larger cities. Some artists 
gained reputations beyond their city of residence, producing work for patrons in a number of cities across 
Italy. It should be noted that artist communities and patronage networks also existed during this period in 
London, Ghent, Paris and Prague, amongst others (Blum, 1969; Foss, 1972; Pavitt, 2000). Evidence can be 
found that artists from these cities with the reputation and capital to do so (most notably artists from 
Flanders), moved to Italy seeking commissions (Hay and Law, 1989). The Renaissance is the archetypal 
example of retainer and commission patronage, so it is this era on which the rest of the sub-section focuses.  
	  	   7	  
 
Five sets of patrons can be identified from the literature on this period for whom patronage and art was of 
material, symbolic and political value: Christian religious orders (including prominent individuals within the 
Church), city authorities, merchant families, princely courts and guilds (Burke, 2014; Kempers, 1993). The 
following sections explore their roles alongside new intermediaries which emerged to regulate, curate and 
reproduce art markets for increasingly professional artists. 
 
3.2.1 Religious Orders 
 
Artists were instructed to paint frescos and panels by religious patrons designed to set examples and teach 
the virtues of Christianity (Burke, 2014). This was a form of political power designed “to secure for the 
Church of Rome what amounted to a monopoly on communication in word and image” and therefore its 
position within society (Kempers, 1993: 21). Clergymen used their position within patronage networks to do 
this, acting simultaneously as patrons funding artists and powerful curatorial intermediaries controlling who, 
where and what kinds of religious buildings were commissioned from architects, and who, how and what 
was depicted in the decorations commissioned from painters. Religious orders also acted as mediators, 
encouraging wealthy families to pay artists to decorate local churches which were being built at a rapid rate 
(Gardner, 2011). Some orders, however, were criticised by senior clergymen for putting the pursuit of 
external patronage ahead of the religious education of the public (ibid). To avoid this senior clergy would 
control the commission of decoration for churches and chapels of lesser orders (Kempers, 1993). This 
hierarchy of intermediation within the Roman Church can also be seen in the scale of commissions for 
more important churches and by more powerful people. The Papal Court is the best example, and 
represents the most consistent source of patronage during this era. Popes sought to maintain the Church’s 
position within society, and in so doing their position as rulers of central Italy, through patronage of the best 
artists in the biggest churches (Burke, 2014). We can see here not only the plural roles the Church played in 
Renaissance patronage networks, but the heterogeneous power relations within these networks: e.g. between 
the Church as patrons and the artists they commissioned; clergymen as mediators of taste between artists 
and wealthy families; and within the Church itself. 
 
3.2.2 City Authorities 
 
While members of religious orders used religious patronage to maintain their position within society, 
members of city authorities used government patronage (Goldthwaite, 2009). City authorities often funded 
cathedral and church building, and in turn furnished them with art. This gained them favour with the 
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Church and demonstrated their importance within society. Larner (1971) adds that in addition to these 
political motives, “governments were consciously acting on behalf of the deepest religious instincts of their 
citizens…Throughout the whole [fourteenth] century the demand for aid to be given in religion came from 
below”. The 14th century also saw the growth of secular patronage of architects, as city authorities 
commissioned government buildings, and artists who were employed to embellish them. Again, paintings 
and statues were designed to glorify the individuals or institutions who commissioned them, and/or the 
principles of those funding the art. For Larner the increase in secular patronage illustrates the tension 
between the Church and city authorities in shaping both artistic styles and projecting “ideals of civil morality” 
within a changing society (1971: 79). City authorities, then, can be understood as significant patrons and as 
mediators seeking to educate publics and curators of what they deemed to reflect civil morality. 
 
3.2.3 Merchant Families and Courts 
 
As the economies of Italian cities grew, so did the wealth of merchant families who came to dominate 
artistic patronage in the 14th and 15th Centuries (Goldthwaite, 2009). Rising wealth brought new appetites for 
art and saw a shift in the power relations between the Church and rich families, with the latter becoming 
more assertive about the style of art commissioned in churches and for their houses and palaces (Kempers, 
1993). We can identify here then, not only a shift in who is patronising artists, but the sites of artistic 
production spreading to include private houses. This was also seen in the growth of courts headed by 
wealthy individuals in the 15th century (Kempers, 1993). Inspired by knights and aristocrats, a ‘bourgeois 
courtliness’ emerged whose “dominant ambition was to win or retain…a place in the nobility, to ‘live nobly’, 
assuming the pose, habits and prejudices of ‘gentleman’” (Jones, 2004: 327). They sought to achieve this, in 
part, through patronage of the arts. Works commissioned by this group of patrons reflected their position in 
society and desire to emulate those above them in the social hierarchy. Competition amongst courts 
increased the demand for artists, and thus their professionalisation and recognition within society 
accelerated (Kempers, 1993). Some artists moved beyond commissions and were appointed as court artists, 
retained to produce work on an exclusive basis. Those artists most in demand by courts had greater freedom 
over style and content of a work, rather than submitting to the will of a patron, and themselves became 
intermediaries by acting as appraiser-prescribers of quality (Shils, 1972). 
 
3.2.4 Guilds 
 
Guilds were key actors and intermediaries throughout the Renaissance and some of the period’s most 
famous art was the result of guild patronage. Guilds were ‘professional corporations’ whose purpose was to: 
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“represent and regulate…the economic interests and responsibilities of matriculated members…to promote 
solidarity…to adjust trade disputes of all kinds, to supervise standards and control trade practices, and 
competition, prices, terms of apprenticeships, and work, to levy dues to indemnify merchants, assist 
members in litigation and the acquisition of materials, merchandise and money…” (Jones, 2004: 229). 
 
We can identify similarities between guilds and the Pencerdd (section 3.1), both functioning as 
intermediaries responsible for reproducing and regulating the quality of art and practice with members 
having “obligation[s] to conform to prescribed codes of civilized behaviour…[and] regulations governing 
images, delivery dates, the dimensions of a work and the materials used” (Kempers, 1993: 167-8). Artisan 
guilds also operated intermediaries of artistic work for their members seeking commissions, helped build 
networks between patrons and artists, and were regulatory intermediaries in the case of disputes (Zolberg, 
1983). There are also instances of guilds taking on roles as intermediaries of production as some city and 
religious authorities tasked guilds with supervising church-building and decoration, including sourcing art 
(Larner, 1971). 
 
3.3 Subscription Lists 
 
Williams (1981) highlights the subscription list as a third mode of patronage. By the 18th century the market 
for art had developed to the point where production for sale was commonplace, but patronage was required 
“to provide early support, or early encouragement, to artists beginning to make their way in the market, or 
unable to sustain some particular project within it” (ibid: 42). Monetary support came from individuals and 
groups to support art in the form of subscription lists. In England, the scale of this form of patronage 
ranged from local networks centred on growing cities with publishing houses, to national networks centred 
on London (Suarez, 2003). The scale was largely dependent on the significance of the author, book and 
potential market. Authors gravitated to cities to access patronage networks, but the portability of books (in 
contrast to frescos) afforded authors some degree of freedom in where they settled. Authors generally had 
the freedom to produce what they wanted, but publication relied on demand for the work existing or being 
able to foster demand through subscription lists. 
 
This nascent form of crowd-patronage was common in the literary arts where authors, their agents and/or 
publishers would nurture networks of patrons to subscribe to their output and provide a guaranteed revenue 
stream (Miller, 1959). Agents acted as classic intermediaries of artistic work, while publishers operated as 
intermediaries of production, distributors and on occasion financial intermediaries between subscribers and 
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authors. Influential individuals amongst lists acted as intermediaries for artistic work (either for authors or 
for their own ends), and those involved with multiple publishers, authors or subscription lists essentially 
became intermediaries of production themselves (Griffin, 1996; Zolberg, 1983). 
 
3.4 Government Patronage 
 
Government patronage has a long history: at the city scale, Italian city authorities during the Renaissance 
supported the arts, and after the French Revolution Napoleon strengthened national organisations for the 
arts (Cummings and Katz, 1987). But it was after WW2 that governments began to engage more fully in 
patronage, using a range of distribution mechanisms, selection criteria and policy interventions (Harris, 
1970). Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) identify four roles governments play in the support of the 
arts – facilitator, patron, architect and engineer – each with varying degrees of curatorial input, but as 
Alexander and Bowler (2014) point out, most countries exhibit a hybrid of modes, especially when 
examining sub-national governance of the arts. 
 
The geographical scale of government patronage is usually limited to work undertaken within a country’s 
borders, by a domestic artist, work produced in a particular language, or work for domestic beneficiaries 
(Arts Council, 2016). State funders may also use secondary eligibility criteria, such as the requirement to 
have a bank account in a particular country, submit to a national accreditation scheme or sign up to a 
government administrative system. As outlined above, artists have historically followed the money, and 
countries with relatively generous arts funding attract artists with the mobility to achieve eligibility criteria. 
As well as operating as important patrons, government bodies undertake a range of intermediation 
depending on the mode of patronage adopted by a government body in explicit and implicit ways. They can 
be, to varying degrees, curatorial intermediaries through their selection criteria and motivations for funding 
art. Through funding of cultural venues, governments play an implicit role as intermediaries of production 
and mediators of quality. Acting on behalf of the public, they can also be understood as intermediaries of 
artistic work. 
 
3.5 Corporate Patronage 
 
State-supported arts funding remains an important, if sometimes controversial, source of patronage for 
artists, but it has been eroded by and to some extent replaced by corporate patronage. Williams (1981) 
highlighted the role of corporations as patrons in the 1970s but not as a distinct mode. At the time he 
couldn’t have foreseen the growth of corporate patronage sparked by the Thatcher and Reagan 
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administrations in the UK and USA during the 1980s (Wu, 2002), and the subsequent trend which spread 
across Europe (Oliver, 1999; Trupiano, 2005; Milan, 2013) and beyond (Lachmann et al., 2014; Zolberg, 
1983; Cummings and Katz, 1989). Corporate patronage during this time, and since, involved a range of 
engagements with artists and the art world including corporations sponsoring exhibitions and concerts, 
funding galleries, commissioning artists to produce work for their offices or as part of product lines, buying 
and exhibiting art, and higher management taking positions on boards of cultural institutions (Wu, 2002; 
Ryan, 2007). While the economic clout of large corporations affords them a global reach to engage artists, 
the latter’s mobility and control over their work is constrained by the influence wanted by a corporation. 
With this form of patronage, then, the geographical scale at which corporation and artist can work is 
increased, as is the possible venue for exhibition. But audience engagement is potentially limited to the 
market segments, or social groups the patron is interested in. 
 
Wu (2002) argues that the 1980s “more than any other [decade] witnessed the utilisation of the power of 
corporate money for active participation in the cultural arena” (see also Zolberg, 1983). By any quantitative 
measure it is certainly the case modern corporate patronage is unprecedented, but if we widen the definition 
of a corporation from capitalist economic agents to the older meaning of “a number of persons united, or 
regarded as united, in one body” (OED, 2017: online) we can see similarities with the patronage of guilds 
and religious orders. Both corporations and guilds and religious orders engaged in patronage for the 
symbolic and political value it earned their organisation and senior officials (Wu, 2002). Again, winning 
political favour and improving one’s social status have clear parallels with the motivations of guilds and 
religious orders during the Italian Renaissance (Cheshire et al., 2011). By the early 2000s, Rectanus (2002) 
described corporate sponsorship of cultural production as “ubiquitous”, and the trend for business 
involvement in the arts has increased. In the UK, for example, local museums and galleries have had public 
funding reduced or entirely removed under austerity budgets, with some told they need to be more 
entrepreneurial including the requirement for private sector representation on their boards (Arts Council, 
2016). Even in France and Italy, where public subsidy of cultural institutions has long been maintained, 
private sector involvement of the arts has increased (Oliver, 1999; Trupiano, 2005). 
 
These shifts prompt a transformation in the type of intermediation undertaken by corporations and 
individuals acting on their behalf. Corporate officers tasked with commissioning artwork become 
intermediaries of artistic work. Sponsoring an exhibition involves implicit mediation as audiences are guided 
to make connections between a brand and artworks (Wu, 2016), while funding a wing or an entire gallery 
identifies corporations as intermediaries of production, and where corporate officers have greater 
involvement in the operation of cultural venues they gain a curatorial function (sometimes in the form of 
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censorship (Schiller, 1991). We can also identify the emergence of new intermediaries of artistic work 
established to work specifically between corporations and cultural producers (Oliver, 1999; Rosenbaum, 
1978; Zolberg, 1983). For corporations (and individual patrons) wanting distance between themselves and 
artists, financial intermediaries have also emerged who manage philanthropic funds through stock market 
investments and seek cultural producers to support. Corporate involvement in artistic patronage, therefore, 
has resulted in art becoming enrolled in the intermediation of products not considered as traditionally 
cultural. In McFall’s (2014) terms, this makes the crowd of intermediaries even larger. 
 
4. Methods and Data 
 
With the context set, section 5 introduces crowd-patronage as a new form of patronage based on the results 
of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy and Leverhulme small grants scheme. It 
sought to analyse the geographies and networks of crowd-patronage mediated by the web, the role of key 
actors in these networks, and the potential impact on existing arts funding. A mixed-methods approach was 
used, organised into three phases. The first phase involved web-scraping pages from Patreon.com over the 
summer of 2015 to build a social network of patrons and artist connections which included data about their 
location, pledges, genre, total patrons and overall income. A sample of 21 826 users was gathered, of which 
5802 (26.6%) were artists and 16 024 (73.4%) were patrons. Precise numbers of users at the time of scraping 
were unavailable, but Patreon confirmed this sample was representative of their artist and patron base.1 This 
data was cleaned and coded, graphed using Gephi (a social network analysis program) and the analysis was 
undertaken in Excel and Gephi. This dataset was supplemented with data from graphtreon.com, which 
aggregates statistics about Patreon users. 
 
The second phase of the project generated data from an online questionnaire with artists using Patreon. 
Participants were approached via Twitter and email, and a total of 115 responses were received. The 
questionnaire focused on how and why artists used Patreon, relationships with patrons using Patreon and 
fans using other platforms, and the kinds of feedback artists received on their work. Data were cleaned and 
coded using SPSS, and statistical analysis was undertaken using Excel and SPSS. 
 
In the third phase of the project 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted with patrons, artists, Patreon 
employees, ‘traditional’ arts funders and patrons, arts organisations, and curators. These were completed 
either via Skype or face-to-face, and lasted between 30 minutes and three hours. The interviews were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Patreon asked for the precise percentage of their userbase the sample was taken from to not be revealed 
for commercial confidentiality reasons.	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transcribed, coded and organised using NVivo. Each phase was complemented by an analysis of various 
documents including webpages and artist profiles, the Patreon website, podcasts, social media, related 
newspaper and blog posts, and videos. Where necessary these were transcribed and included in the NVivo 
project. The following section draws on insights from all three phases of the research. 
 
5. Crowd-patronage 
 
The ‘crowd’ has become a popular term to prefix a range of activities facilitated by internet-based tools 
including crowdsourcing data, crowdsolving problems, crowdsearching for lost items, crowdvoting for 
gathering opinions and crowdfunding to raise investment. This section introduces crowd-patronage, a new 
form of patronage which shares similarities with some kinds of crowdfunding, but is distinct in a number of 
important ways. I begin this section by highlighting these differences, before examining its emergence 
through a case study of Patreon. 
 
Nesta (2013) dates the beginnings of modern crowdfunding to rock group Marillion’s successful campaign 
to fund a tour in 1997. Since then crowdfinancing had grown to an estimated $34 billion in 2015 (Forbes, 
2015). As the industry has grown, the range of projects funded has increased and the models of funding 
diversified. Langley (2016) outlines five key types: ‘peer-to-peer’, ‘equity’ and ‘fixed-income’ funding, which 
are closer to venture capital and traditional financial products, and ‘donation’ and ‘reward’ crowdfunding, 
which are closer to patronage-style relationships. As the crowdfunding industry has grown in both scale and 
scope, so too has academic interest. Research has focused on four broad areas: what makes campaigns 
successful (Hobbs et al., 2016; Yuan et al., 2016); the role of fans in funding and production processes 
(Booth, 2015); the potential of crowdfunding as an alternative form of finance (Lasrado and Lugmayr, 2013); 
and crowdfunding as part of wider financial ecologies (Langley, 2016; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). The aim 
of this paper is not to re-cover established ground about crowdfunding, but to introduce crowd-patronage 
as a distinct mode of patronage. Below the distinction with other forms of crowdfunding become clear, but 
here it is worth stating the main differences. First, crowd-patronage allows smaller and repeated payments to 
artists rather than larger one-off pledges. Second, crowd-patronage is not all-or-nothing funding. Pledge 
levels are used, but money is transferred to artists regardless of levels being reached. Finally, crowd-
patronage is not reward-centric: patrons are not making an investment in an individual or organisation with 
an expected return, nor are they paying for a reward (in most cases). The focus is on helping artists to 
continue and develop their practice. 
 
5.1 The Emergence of Crowd-patronage Platforms 
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At the start of this research project two crowd-patronage platforms existed: Patreon and Subbable. Both 
were established in 2013 – the former by Jack Conte and Sam Yam, the latter by John and Hank Green – to 
facilitate the transfer of financial support from patrons to artists.2 In 2015 Patreon acquired Subbable after 
the latter’s payment provider (Amazon Payments) changed the payment product Subbable used, which 
meant “creators on Subbable were about to see a 30 to 40% decrease in their monthly income” (Jack Conte, 
quoted in Patreon, 2015). Faced with this problem the Green brothers accepted an offer from Patreon to 
acquire Subbable. Immediately we can see a financial intermediary shaping the nature of crowd-patronage, 
as within two years of its birth, Subbable ceased to exist and without Patreon’s intervention artists would 
have seen their income drastically reduced. 
 
Both platforms were established to solve the problems of declining incomes attributed to online piracy, 
reduced ad-revenue as a result of increased use of ad-blockers, and falling revenue per advert view on 
distribution platforms such as YouTube (Perlberg, 2016; XOXO Festival, 2013). They sought to solve this 
problem by facilitating direct payments from fans to artists and to create closer relationships between them. 
The mechanism for doing this is not the established ‘all-or-nothing’ model (Langley, 2016) used by other 
crowdfunding platforms, but a subscription-based system where fans become patrons by pledging $x per 
month (or per piece of media an artist releases). In return Patreon takes 5% of the pledge from patrons. 
This is akin to the subscription lists outlined above, but under this contemporary model patrons don’t 
necessarily receive a product or reward, as an artist may not produce anything that month. This model 
allows artists to focus on their practice, rather than one-off projects in an all-or-nothing model. Participants 
adopted both models, with the latter useful for funding exhibitions, albums or other expensive outputs, the 
former covering day-to-day costs. To understand more let us turn our attention to the characteristics of 
crowd-patronage by again examining the geographic scale of patronage networks, the mobility of artists, the 
relations between patrons and artists and the role of intermediaries. 
 
5.2 Scale of Patreon’s Patronage Network 
 
One of the major differences between crowd-patronage and the forms outlined in section 3 are the number 
of patrons artists gain and their geographic spread: Patreon’s patronage network is large and global. At the 
time of writing there were 50 412 active artists receiving 1.4m pledges each month and in 2016 Patreon 
facilitated $100m of payments between patrons and artists (Conte, 2017). The top 10 creators receive 3% of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Artists, or creators as Patreon terms them, include people working in the following fields: video and film, 
music, writing, comics, drawing and painting, animation, podcasts, games, photography, comedy, science, 
education, crafts and DIY, and dance and theatre.	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this total, and the top five artists were earning more than $30 000 a month (Graphtreon, 2017). This 
represents significant amounts of revenue for artists, and by the end of 2017 the total transferred from 
patrons to artists is predicted to eclipse the $147m budget of the US National Endowment for the Arts 
(McIntyre, 2017; NEA, 2017). 
 
As outlined in section 4, a sample of 21 826 Patreon users was gathered to interrogate these networks. The 
number of artists supported by patrons within the sample ranges from 1 to 91, and the mean number 
supported was 3.4. Artists have between 1 and 7973 patrons, and 50 artists in the sample have 1000 or more 
patrons. The mean number of backers was 90 but the mode was 2, highlighting a long tail (1567 artists had 
fewer than 10 patrons). Of the sample 4170 artists (71.87%) and 4263 patrons (26.7%) provided 
information relating to their location, ranging from zip/postcodes to their continent of residence. This data 
was coded to country or continent with 96 locations identified. The sample includes locations from every 
continent including Antarctica (0 artists, 2 patrons) but the geographical distribution is uneven.3 The USA 
has the highest number of both artists (2643 or 45.55%) and patrons (2430 or 15.16%) in the sample. 
Participants suggested this was the result of the maturity and size of US-based artists using the internet to 
distribute work; an established culture of philanthropy in the US; Patreon being an American company; and 
the Patreon website being only available in English. 
 
In terms of international flows, the US is the only country where the majority of financial transactions are 
domestic. Within the sample, 77.2% of the flows originating in the the US go to US-based artists, while 
Spain has a 50-50 split between domestic and international flows. Every other country has a net outflow of 
support, and excluding countries with fewer than 10 patrons, every other country’s top destination for flows 
is the US. The geographical scope and magnitude of these flows mark out crowd-patronage as both 
quantitatively and qualitatively different from other modes of patronage, with the probable exception of 
corporate patronage. 
 
5.3 Mobility of Artists 
 
The mobility of artists highlighted in section 3 varied from era to era. The general trend is artists moving to 
hubs of patronage where finance is available. The nature of much of the art being produced historically – 
architecture and decorations for specific buildings – together with relatively poor transport infrastructure, 
meant it was often produced in-situ, or at least very near to its intended home. It was only later that art 
became more portable and artists could work at a distance, but even then, the eligibility criteria for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See supplementary table for full list. 
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government patronage constrained this. Technology has enabled the distanciation of patronage networks 
over space, but when large sums of money are involved intermediaries still require face-to-face interaction 
with artists and agents. Patrons can also demand proximity to, if not an artist, then the artworks, given this 
is also the means of consumption (Thornton, 2009). 
 
In contrast, the globalisation of patrons highlighted in the previous section does not require Patreon artists 
to globalise their practice. The process of following the patrons – or more accurately the money – seen in 
previous eras is no longer necessary: Patreon handles that, acting as an intermediary of artistic work, 
financial intermediary and distributor. Moreover, with dozens, hundreds and even thousands of patrons 
around the world, doing so is impossible. Patreon’s role as an intermediary connecting artists and patrons 
via an online platform helps reshape the geographies of patronage by reducing the significance of creative 
hubs which dominate geographies of the creative industries (Boix et al., 2015). However, as the previous 
section illustrates, the distribution of patrons and artists, and the flows of finance remain geographically 
uneven. The web-mediated nature of patron-artist relationships and the digital form of much of the art also 
facilitate this changing geography. Artists using Patreon frequently work from home, using digital platforms 
to distribute and exhibit their work. For many a computer and internet connection are all that is required to 
upload work and engage with Patreon. Performance-based artists such as musicians, theatre companies and 
comedians are more mobile, exhibiting their work on tours, but respondents reported this is usually to an 
audience who are not (or at least not yet) Patreon-based patrons. 
 
5.4 Patron-Artist Relationships 
 
The low levels of artist mobility raises questions about the nature of relationships between artists and 
patrons. Throughout history these relationships have taken many forms, but generally involve patrons 
exerting some form of control over the art being produced, either through explicit direction or from 
eligibility criteria (Williams, 1981). Within crowd-patronage networks, relationships are also varied, but 
control is not a primary concern of patrons. The source of this different form of patronage relationship can 
be found in Patreon’s mission “…to help every creator in the world achieve sustainable income” (Patreon, 
2017). This philosophy is evident throughout Patreon’s activities including in advice for artists on the 
website, through social media, in media interviews with staff and the top artists Patreon uses to promote the 
company. In turn, this is reproduced by other artists in their own promotion of Patreon to fans to the extent 
that it is an accepted norm amongst the community, and neophytes are quickly enrolled into this way of 
thinking. In this way Patreon and artists act as regulatory intermediaries reproducing certain behaviors 
amongst the community. 
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Further, in contrast to other forms of crowdfunding, the pitch to patrons is not that they want to do a new 
activity or produce a new product (in contrast with other forms of crowdfunding), but that they want to 
continue what they are doing, do more of it and do it better. This is reflected in the nature of the pledge 
levels artists develop for patrons, which take two main forms: artist-centric goals and patron-centric rewards. 
Artist-centric goals include targets such as: 
 
“$200/week – This point would allow me to be more able to afford better equipment to produce my work.” 
(Wilson, 2016) 
 
Patron-centric rewards include thankyous, a credit on a website or exclusive content. Artists are discouraged 
by Patreon from making too much extra work for themselves by producing special work for patrons, and 
this is another difference compared to rewards-based crowdfunding. Patreon also recommend artists don’t 
use the website as a paywall, producing work only for patrons. As a Patreon employee explained it during an 
interview: 
 
“what the heart of it is everything is always for free…I think that changes the way that rewards can be 
viewed, because it’s not like I pledge this to get this. It’s I pledge this because I love you, and also I get this.” 
 
(Participant P3 – interview response) 
 
This attitude is also reflected in the demands patrons make of artists. Based on a questionnaire with artists 
there is a statistically significant difference between the types of feedback artists receive from patrons and 
non-paying fans (n=115, p=<0.05). In terms of demands for particular kinds of content, 9.1% of 
respondents stated they received such demands from patrons, compared to 14.3% from non-paying fans. 
Patrons accepted this relationship, signing up to support an artist because they wanted them to continue to 
produce their work. As one put it: 
 
“The art is theirs. Not mine. If they ask for ideas and I happen to have one, I would share, but I'm 
supporting their creativity.”  
(Patron 5 – interview response) 
 
Patrons act as intermediaries of artistic work (working for the artist) by promoting artists’ work through 
their own social networks, but few seek a relationship with artists beyond the occasional interaction on 
	  	   18	  
patreon.com. This relationship means that having a crowd of patrons doesn’t produce re-intermediary 
effects that increase the amount of work an artist has to undertake, in contrast to the effects created by 
intermediaries of production, distribution and curation discussed in the following section. The more direct 
relationship between artist and patron that Patreon sought to create, then, is specifically a more direct 
financial relationship, rather than a personal one. 
 
5.5 The Role of Intermediaries 
 
As outlined above, intermediaries come in many forms, and have proliferated in the art world through time. 
One of Patreon’s founding principles was disintermediation and creating a more direct relationship between 
artists and fans. For artists using the site, this includes record labels, art dealers, advertisers, distribution 
platforms and publishers. Disintermediation is an attractive proposition because, as one participant put it, “I 
hated watching my cheese get cut in half eight times before they got back to me” (Participant P8 – interview 
response). But, as discussed in section 2, the role played by intermediaries is so embedded into production 
networks rather than processes of disintermediation, we instead see re-intermediation. Patreon, for instance, 
are themselves a multifaceted intermediary, managing the pledge system and taking a 5% cut of transfers 
between patrons and artists, distributing and regulating content, curating work, and acting as an intermediary 
of artistic work for artists. They don’t process the payments themselves; instead another financial 
intermediary – Stripe, a payment processor – handles the monthly transfer of money between patrons and 
artists, provide security in the process and also charge a processing fee.  
 
As re-intermediation increases the number of intermediaries of production, distribution and curation, the 
plurality of their functions grows. Additional work is created as individuals become ‘artist-as-intermediary’ 
(Kribs, 2016). For example, although there is less reliance on these platforms as sources of revenue, content 
still needs to be formatted and uploaded for online consumption. Based on the questionnaire responses, 47% 
of respondents use four or more distribution intermediaries to host their work, and 46% communicate with 
fans and patrons using four or more different communication platforms. This creates a lot of work once 
undertaken by intermediaries of production and artistic work (for employers) and is in contrast to the 
relatively low amount of work created from patron demands (or lack thereof). 
 
As in other modes of patronage, intermediaries play curatorial roles, and two important processes emerge. 
First, distribution platforms provide traditional curatorial functions by promoting content a user may like. 
Patreon’s ‘featured’ section on their homepage is based on decisions made by a dedicated team of staff, 
while algorithms develop recommendations in a user’s ‘suggested’ section. YouTube’s ‘trending’ list uses 
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viewing metrics to highlight popular videos in different territories as they emerge, while their ‘recommended’ 
section combines a user’s viewing history, subscriptions and general viewer metrics to make suggestions 
(Allocca, 2015; Marissa, 2016). Algorithms become both appraisers of content based on the quantification 
of website use, and curators making suggestions for what a user will like. This kind of algorithmic curation is 
not as neutral as it may appear, however. The code is written by humans based on various assumptions 
about what people may like (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015), trends in algorithmic models come and go, and 
emphasis is put on different metrics often decided by commercial interests such as advertisers. Thus, 
although the curatorial function of intermediaries has changed compared to other modes of patronage, 
algorithms are written to seek similar political and economic goals for their authors. In addition, artists can 
also adopt functions as mediators and curators by recommending other artists to their patrons.  
 
Second, the terms of use and community guidelines of intermediaries of production produce regulatory 
functions about the kind of content which can and cannot be hosted on particular sites. Patreon and 
YouTube do not allow pornography, but the former’s guidelines reflect their commitment to artists:  
 
“some of the world’s most beautiful and historically significant art often depicts nudity and sexual 
expression. Because of that, we allow nudity and suggestive imagery, as long as it is marked NSFW4”  
(Patreon, 2016).  
 
NSFW material, however, isn’t included as part of the ‘featured’ page, and the algorithm generating the 
‘suggested’ section filters it out. These guidelines are enforced in various ways, and open to interpretation. 
YouTube has the expertise to use algorithms to detect potentially pornographic material, but like smaller 
sites, also relies on users and staff to monitor content (Chen, 2014). These regulatory functions have 
parallels with the roles played by the Pencerdd in 12th century Wales and guilds in Renaissance Italy. They 
determine what is and what isn’t suitable to be distributed, but in contrast these platforms aren’t designed or 
run by the artists who use them. They are commercial organisations who are in turn regulated by legal 
systems, and it is to these systems and shareholders they are primarily accountable. Artists are therefore 
constrained by wider systems that may not explicitly seek to impact cultural production, nonetheless 
influence it through the plural intermediary functions of actors like YouTube. 
 
6. Conclusions 
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This article has introduced crowd-patronage as a new and distinct mode of patronage. In so doing this paper 
has outlined the global scale of crowd-patronage networks, a different set of relationships between patrons 
and artists, and how processes of re-intermediation have transferred work from intermediaries to artists. It 
has also illustrated crowd-patronage as distinct from the ‘all-or-nothing’ models of crowdfunding, providing 
artists a regular income and allowing them to focus on their practice, rather than one-off projects. By 
examining artists and patrons, and the role played by intermediaries in crowd-patronage networks, the focus 
here has widened from cultural intermediaries to include financial and regulatory actors which play an 
important role in the (re)production of geographies of patronage. A functional perspective has also 
highlighted the plural roles these intermediaries play in patronage both in crowd-patronage and established 
modes of support. Such an appreciation provides a more nuanced way to understand the ways in which 
aesthetic and symbolic value are entwined with financial and regulatory processes. I want to finish this article 
by outlining two areas which the findings here highlight are in need of further examination. 
 
First, the role of sociotechnical devices such as algorithms has been highlighted, and underlines the need for 
so-called ‘non-human’ actors to be examined further in the field of cultural production. Understanding the 
ways in which they are written, the assumptions made in the mathematics, the data they use to classify and 
recommend, and the ways they are mobilised are crucial to understand cultural production as more work is 
produced, curated and distributed online. Second, the geographies of crowd-patronage highlighted here – 
global networks and low artist mobility – call for a re-evaluation of the importance of creative industry hubs 
in the economy for individual artists. If a computer and internet connection are sufficient for artists not only 
to distribute work, but to find support for it, what does this mean for national and international hubs of 
creative work? Are artists using crowd-patronage to fund their practice, creating new geographies which 
undermine the role of cities in creative production? What response can we expect from multinational 
intermediaries? 
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